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Abstract
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to
allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by
self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism Random Priority is asymptotically the best
mechanism for this purpose, when comparing its welfare to the optimal social welfare using the
canonical worst-case approximation ratio. Despite its popularity, the efficiency loss indicated
by the worst-case ratio does not have a constant bound [20]. Recently, [16] show that when the
agents’ preferences are drawn from a uniform distribution, its average-case approximation ratio
is upper bounded by 3.718. They left it as an open question of whether a constant ratio holds
for general scenarios. In this paper, we offer an affirmative answer to this question by showing
that the ratio is bounded by 1/µ when the preference values are independent and identically
distributed random variables, where µ is the expectation of the value distribution. This upper
bound also improves the upper bound of 3.718 in [16] for the Uniform distribution. Moreover,
under mild conditions, the ratio has a constant bound for any independent random values. En
route to these results, we develop powerful tools to show the insights that in most instances the
efficiency loss is small.
1 Introduction
Studies in Mechanism Design focus on designing mechanisms in which truth-telling is a domi-
nant strategy, and so the rational, risk-neutral agents are motivated to play their truth-telling
strategies. Subject to this qualitative constraint, a truthful mechanism quantitatively optimizes an
objective such as social welfare or revenue. Build upon the classical Mechanism Design framework,
Algorithmic Mechanism Design [31] advances research and has evolved to employing two typical
analytic tools in Computer Science. One of these tools imposes polynomial-time implementability
on designing mechanisms, and the other evaluates mechanism performances through the lens of
the worst-case analysis. Typically, the (worst-case) approximation ratio assesses to what extent a
mechanism approximately optimizes an objective over all possible inputs and it is dominated by the
worst-case inputs [34]. There is now an extensive literature on topics including matching [5, 17],
scheduling [14, 28], facility location [21], kidney exchange [22], fair division [13], social choice [6],
and auction design [7, 24, 30]. For a more detailed summary, we refer the reader to [32].
∗jie.zhang@soton.ac.uk
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In the assignment problem (a.k.a., one-sided matching or house allocation problem), there is a
set of agents and a set of items. The agents participate in a mechanism by reporting their private
preferences over the items. The mechanism then assigns items to agents, according to a pre-defined
allocation function. The folklore mechanism Random Priority (a.k.a., Random Serial Dictatorship)
is mainstream because it satisfies appealing properties including anonymity, truthfulness, and ex-
post Pareto efficiency. In addition, there exists no mechanism that is ex-ante Pareto efficient while
keeping the first two desired properties [39]. Random Priority and its variants have notable practical
applications. For example, they are used in United States Naval Academy placement [35], social
or government-subsidised housing [4], graduate housing allocation at a large number of universities
[3], and high school student assignment in New York [33].
For the purpose of maximizing social welfare, i.e., the sum of all agents’ utilities, Random
Priority can only achieve a Θ(1/
√
n) fraction of the optimal social welfare in the worst case,
where n is the number of agents and items, and it is asymptotically the best amongst all truthful
mechanisms [20]. This negative result was considered a cautionary tale discouraging the wide
applications of Random Priority. Fortunately, the smoothed analysis and average-case analysis
mitigate it by revealing positive results on social welfare approximation. In [16], the authors show
that when the worst-case inputs are subject to small random noise, Random Priority attains social
welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. In addition, when agents’ preferences are
drawn from a uniform distribution, on average, the optimal social welfare is no more than 1+e times
of the social welfare attainable by Random Priority, where e is the Euler’s number. Therefore, on
average, the efficiency loss is small. The primal question that remains open is: Does the constant
average-case ratio result hold for general probability distributions? In this paper, we partially
answer this question by showing the following results.
• When agents’ preference values are independent and identically distributed random variables,
the average-case approximation ratio is upper bounded by 1/µ, where µ is the expectation of
these random variables.
• When agents’ preferences values are independent but not necessarily identically distributed
random variables, under mild conditions, the average-case approximation ratio is upper
bounded by a constant.
We note that the 1/µ upper bound for the i.i.d. case improves the 3.718 upper bound for the
Uniform distribution U[0, 1], as its expectation µ = 12 and 1/µ yields an upper bound of 2. Taken
together, these results further pin down the wide-applicability of the Random Priority mechanism,
for which the worst-case analysis is insufficient to manifest.
To achieve these results, we employ the Central Limit Theorems and carefully calibrate the
values of some parameters in a few building blocks to ascertain the rate that the properly normalized
sum of preference values converges to a Normal distribution. By successfully compositing these
building blocks together, we bound the average-case ratios.
1.1 Related Work
The one-sided matching problem was introduced in [25] and has been studied extensively ever
since. Over the years, several different mechanisms have been proposed with various desirable
properties related to truthfulness, fairness and economic efficiency with Probabilistic Serial [2, 10,
11, 26] and Random Priority [3, 8, 15, 37] being the two prominent examples. In the indivisible
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goods setting, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) method is well-studied and generalized to investigate
various problems. In particular, [3] proposed an adaptation of the TTC method and established an
equivalence between the adapted mechanism and Random Priority. [27] proposed several extensions
of these popular mechanisms and presented an equivalence result between those mechanisms in
terms of economic efficiency. In the presence of incentives, the assignment problem was extensively
studied in Computer Science and Economics over the years [17, 29, 39]. We refer the interested
reader to surveys [2, 36]. [10] studied the approximation ratio of matching mechanisms, when the
objective is maximization of ordinal social welfare, a notion of efficiency that they define based
solely on ordinal information.
Under the average-case analysis framework, [38] tackled the scheduling unrelated machines
problem and showed that the average-case approximation ratio of the mechanism devised in [28]
is upper bounded by a constant, when the machines’ costs follow any independent and identical
distribution.
A similar notion but fundamentally different to our approach exists in Bayesian analysis [12, 23].
We leave a more detailed discussion of the two notions to the next section after formally present
the definition of the average-case approximation ratio, to highlight the comparison.
2 Preliminaries
We study the one-sided matching problem that consists of n agents and n indivisible items. The
agents are endowed with von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over the items. Throughout the
paper, we denote the utility derived by agent i on obtaining a unit amount of item j by aij . In
particular, following the classical literature [9, 39], agents’ preferences aij are represented by unit-
range values. That is, with normalization, any agent i’s valuation on its most preferred item is 1,
i.e., maxj{aij} = 1, and its valuation on the least preferred item is 0, i.e., minj{aij} = 0. However,
note that our model would be more general and some calculations would be cleaner if we drop these
constraints but only require that 0 ≤ aij ≤ 1, ∀i, j ∈ [n]. A valuation profile (or interchangeably,
an instance) of agents’ preferences can be represented by a matrix A = [aij ]n×n, where the row
vector (ai1, . . . , ain) indicates the valuation of agent i’s preference.
A matching mechanism collects agents’ preference valuations and output an assignment of
items to them. Denote a matching assignment by a matrix X = [xij]n×n, where xij indicates the
probability of agent i receiving item j. So, a mechanism is a mapping from the input instance A
to an output allocation X. Since there is an equal number of agents and items, X will be a doubly
stochastic matrix. According to the Birkhoff - von Neumann Theorem, every doubly stochastic
matrix can be decomposed into a convex combination of some permutation matrices. Therefore,
any probabilistic allocation X can be interpreted as a convex combination of a set of deterministic
allocations. We denote the set of all possible instances by A and denote the set of all possible
allocation by X . Given a mechanism M and a valuation profile A ∈ A, as well as its allocation
X(A) ∈ X , we denote the expected utility of agent i by ui(X(A)) =
∑
j aijxij and denote the
expected social welfare by SWM(X(A)) =
∑
i ui(X(A)). When the context is clear, we drop the
allocation notation and simply refer them by ui(A) and SWM(A).
In Mechanism Design, agents are self-interested and may misreport their values if that results in
a better matching (from their perspective). We are interested in truthful mechanisms, under which
agents cannot improve their utilities by misreporting. Formally, ui(ai,a−i) ≥ ui(a′i,a−i),∀i, where
ai is agent i’s true valuations, a−i is other agents’ valuations, and a′i is any possible misreported
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valuation from agent i. The mechanism which is the focus of this paper, Random Priority (RP),
is a truthful mechanism. It fixes an ordering of the agents uniformly at random and then allocates
them their most preferred item from the set of available items based on this ordering.
The canonical measure of efficiency loss due to the restriction to the class of truthful mechanisms,
compared to the optimal social welfare, is the worst-case approximation ratio,
rworst(M) = sup
A∈A
SWOPT(A)
SWM(A)
,
where SWOPT(A) = maxX∈X
∑n
i=1 ui(X) is the optimal social welfare which is equal to the value of
the maximum weight matching between agents and items. It is shown in [20] that Random Priority
achieves the matching approximation ratio bound of Θ(
√
n). The average-case approximation ratio
of a truthful mechanism M is the expectation of the ratio of the optimal social welfare to the social
welfare attained by mechanism M. That is,
raverage(M) = E
aij∼D
[
SWOPT(A)
SWM(A)
]
,
where the valuation variable aij follows a distribution D. This notion of average-case analysis is a
pointwise division that is in the same manner as the worst-case ratio rworst(M) and the smoothed
ratio studied in [16]. When randomly draw an instance from a distribution, it informs us the
expected value of how far is the social welfare attainable by a truthful mechanism M on the instance
compared to the optimal social welfare on the same instance.
In Bayesian mechanism design, the dominant approach is the ratio of expectations, defined as
E [SWOPT(A)] ≤ r ·E [SWM(A)]. When one’s interest is the expected social welfare of a mechanism
over all possible inputs compared to the expected optimal social welfare, rather than a pointwise
comparison over the same instance, the ratio of expectations would be more appropriate. In most
cases, it is more tractable, as it calculates two expectations separately.
3 Independent and Identically Distributed Random Values
Subject to the unit-range normalization, there are two preset values (0 and 1, respectively) in each
row of a preference matrix A. Let S be the set of indices such that their corresponding entries in
A are preset. That is, S = {(i, j) : aij = 0 or aij = 1}. Obviously, |S| = 2n, where | ∗ | denotes
the cardinality of a set1. In this section, we allow the remaining n2 − 2n values to be independent
and identically distributed random variables following a distribution D with expectation µ and
variance σ2, i.e., aij ∼ D[0, 1], ED[aij ] = µ,Var[aij ] = σ2,∀i, j. We will show that the average-case
approximation ratio of RP is upper bounded by a constant, for any distribution D[0, 1]. In order
to prove our main results, we partition the average-case ratio into two cases according to the social
welfare attainable by RP. We carefully choose a scalar such that in one case, the probability that
the social welfare attainable by RP is smaller than the scalar is asymptotically small (even if there
is a large efficiency loss in this case), and in the other case, the social welfare attainable by RP is
asymptotically close to the optimal social welfare. En route to complying with these two conditions
simultaneously, we employ the Central Limit Theorem and control the rate that the normalized
sum of individual values converges to a normal distribution by carefully calibrating a scalar.
1It does not matter which 2n of these valuations aij are preset. Our proofs hold for any choice of these 2n entries
in A.
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One of the tools that we use to control the convergence rate is the Berry-Esseen Theorem [18].
Theorem 1. (Berry-Esseen) For n ≥ 1, let X1, · · · ,Xn be i.i.d. random variables such that
E[X1] = 0 and D[X1] = σ
2. Denote Sn =
X1+···+Xn
σ
√
n
and Fn(x) = Pr{Sn ≤ x}. Then
sup
x
|Fn(x)− Φ(x)| ≤ C · E[|X1|]
3
σ3
√
n
,
where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard Normal distribution, and 0.409 <
C < 0.475.
Now we will use the Berry-Esseen Theorem and the Central Limit Theorem to prove a key
lemma.
Lemma 1. For a given preference instance A, the probability that the social welfare SWRP (A)
attainable by Random Priority is less than λ, is bounded by the following inequality.
Pr {SWRP (A) ≤ λ} ≤ 1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2) ,
where C is the constant in the Berry-Esseen Theorem and λ = 1 + µ(n− 2)− σ
√
2(n−2)
n lnn.
Proof. Firstly, for any preference instance A, the social welfare attainable by Random Priority is
lower bounded by the following inequality.
SWRP (A) ≥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij
=
1
n
∑
(i,j)∈S
aij +
1
n
∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij
= 1 +
1
n
∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij .
Therefore,
Pr {SWRP (A) ≤ λ} ≤ Pr

1 + 1n
∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij ≤ λ


= Pr


∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij ≤ µ · n(n− 2)− σ
√
2n(n − 2) lnn

 (1)
Secondly, since aij are i.i.d. random variables and E[aij ] = µ,Var[aij ] = σ
2,∀i, j, we know that
aij − µ are i.i.d. random variables such that E[aij − µ] = 0,Var[aij − µ] = σ2,∀i, j. Let
Tn(n−2) =
∑
(i,j)6∈S(aij − µ)
σ
√
n(n− 2)
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and Gn(n−2)(x) = Pr{Tn(n−2) ≤ x}.
Following Theorem 1, the random variables Tn(n−2) converge in distribution to the standard
Normal distribution N(0, 1). That is, Tn(n−2)
d−→ N(0, 1). In addition, the rate of convergence is
bounded by
sup
x
|Gn(n−2)(x)− Φ(x)| ≤
C · E [|aij − µ|]3
σ3
√
n(n− 2) ≤
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2) ,
where (i, j) /∈ S, and the second inequality holds because 0 < aij < 1 and 0 < µ < 1. Therefore,∣∣Pr{Tn(n−2) ≤ x}− Φ(x)∣∣ ≤ C
σ3
√
n(n− 2) , ∀x.
⇒
∣∣∣∣∣Pr
{∑
(i,j)6∈S(aij − µ)
σ
√
n(n− 2) ≤ x
}
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cσ3√n(n− 2)
⇒ Pr


∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij ≤ µ · n(n− 2) + x · σ
√
n(n− 2)


≤
∫ x
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2) . (2)
Let x = −
√
2 lnn. Obviously, −x→ +∞ when n approaches infinity. Following (2), we get that
Pr


∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij ≤ µ · n(n− 2)− σ
√
2 lnn ·
√
n(n− 2)


≤
∫ −√2 lnn
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2)
=
∫ +∞
√
2 lnn
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2)
≤ 1√
2pi
√
2 lnn
e− lnn +
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2)
=
1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2) . (3)
Combining (1) and (3), we prove that
Pr {SWRP (A) ≤ λ} ≤ 1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2) .
We shall see that λ was chosen such that λ ∼ Θ(n), and Pr {SWRP (A) ≤ λ} ∼ O( 1n). After
establishing these building blocks, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 2. The average-case approximation ratio of Random Priority, when agents’ preferences
are independent and identically distributed random variables, is upper bounded by the constant 1/µ,
where µ is the expectation of these random variables.
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Proof. To calculate the expectation of the ratio of the optimal social welfare to the social welfare
attained by RP, we partition the value space of the ratio into two cases according to the threshold
parameter λ. In each case, we multiply the ratio by the probability that the case occurs. That is,
raverage(RP) = E
aij∼D
[
SWOPT(A)
SWRP(A)
]
≤ Pr{SWRP (A) > λ} · n
λ
+ Pr{SWRP (A) ≤ λ} · rworst
Here we plugged in the fact that SWOPT(A) ≤ n, for any instance A.
In addition, as shown in [20], rworst ∼ Θ(
√
n), there exists a constant c1, such that rworst ≤
c1 ·
√
n, for sufficiently large n. Also, it is obvious that Pr{SWRP (A) > λ} ≤ 1. Now, we plug in
these fact and the results established in Lemma 1.
raverage(RP) ≤ 1 · n
1 + µ(n− 2)− σ
√
2(n−2)
n lnn
+
[
1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C
σ3
√
n(n− 2)
]
· c1
√
n
≤ 1
µ

 1
1− 2n + 1µn − σ
√
2 lnn
µn

+ c1
2
√
pin lnn
+
C · c1
σ3
√
n− 2
Since 11−|t| < 1 + 2|t|, when |t| < 12 . As long as
∣∣∣ 2n − 1µn + σ√2 lnnµn ∣∣∣ < 12 , we conclude that
raverage(RP) ≤ 1
µ
(
1 + 2
∣∣∣∣∣ 2n − 1µn + σ
√
2 ln n
µn
∣∣∣∣∣
)
+
c1
2
√
pin lnn
+
C · c1
σ3
√
n− 2
=
1
µ
+
2
µ
∣∣∣∣∣ 2n − 1µn + σ
√
2 lnn
µn
∣∣∣∣∣+ c12√pin lnn + C · c1σ3√n− 2
→ 1
µ
.
4 Independent but not Necessarily Identical Random Values
In this section, we further generalize the results in Section 3 to the scenario that the n2−2n elements
in {aij|(i, j) /∈ S} are independent random values but are not restricted to following an identical
distribution. So, they may have different expectations E[aij] = µij and variance Var[aij ] = σ
2
ij ,∀i, j.
We will show that under mild conditions, the average-case approximation ratio of RP has a constant
upper bound. The primary obstruction in this generalization is the difficulty to appropriately
control the rate of convergence of the normalized sum of the random values, in order to obtain
a constant upper bound. However, we are able to pinpoint a mild condition, such that when the
random variables aij comply with the condition, we can establish similar building blocks to the last
section. By carefully calibrating the parameter λ, we can assemble them in a compatible way to
get a constant upper bound.
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Firstly, we identify the following mild conditions:
(i)
∑
(i,j)/∈S µij = Ω(n
2); (ii)
∑
(i,j)/∈S σ
2
ij = ω(n).
Note that there are n2−2n elements in the set {aij|(i, j) /∈ S}, so the first condition simply implies
that there would not be many of these aij whose expectations are asymptotically small. The second
condition merely implies that the variances of the valuations are not too small. In other words,
the first condition excludes those instances that many agents’ preferences are negligible; the second
condition requires their preferences to admit a magnitude of variation.
Secondly, to control the rate of convergence, we will employ the following theorem which is
a refined version of the Berry-Esseen Theorem. It holds for non-identically distributed random
variables [19].
Theorem 3. Let Z1, · · · , Zn be independent random variables such that E[Zi] = 0, D[Zi] = σ2i ,
and E[|Zi|]3 <∞. Denote Xn = Z1+···+Zn√∑
i σ
2
i
and Fn(x) = Pr{Xn ≤ x}. Then there exists a constant
C ′ such that
sup
x
|Fn(x)− Φ(x)| ≤ C
′ ·∑i E[|Zi|]3(∑
i σ
2
i
) 3
2
,
where Φ(x) is the CDF of the standard Normal distribution.
Now, let Zij := aij − µij, where (i, j) /∈ S. Denote their normalized sum of Zij and the CDF
ofXn(n−2) by
Xn(n−2) :=
∑
i,j Zij√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
, FXn(n−2)(x) = Pr(Xn(n−2) ≤ x).
Next, let λ = 1 +
∑
(i,j)/∈S µij
n −
√
2 lnn
n ·
√∑
(i,j)/∈S σ
2
ij . With this carefully chosen value of λ, we
are able to show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For a given preference matrix A, the probability that the social welfare SWRP (A)
attainable by Random Priority is less than λ, is bounded by the following inequality.
Pr {SWRP (A) ≤ λ} ≤ 1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
,
where C ′ is the constant in Theorem 3.
Proof. On the one hand, SWRP (A) ≥ 1 + 1n
∑
(i,j)6∈S aij implies that
Pr {SWRP (A) ≤ λ} ≤ Pr

1 + 1n
∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij ≤ λ


= Pr


∑
(i,j)6∈S
aij ≤
∑
(i,j)/∈S
µij −
√
2 ln n ·
√ ∑
(i,j)/∈S
σ2ij

 (4)
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On the other hand, according to Theorem 3, there exists a constant C ′, such that
sup
x
|FXn(n−2)(x)− Φ(x)| ≤
C ′ ·∑i,j E[|Zij |]3(∑
i,j σ
2
ij
) 3
2
.
Since |Zij | ≤ 1, we have E[|Zij |]3 ≤ E[|Zij |]2 = σ2ij . So,
sup
x
|FXn(n−2)(x)− Φ(x)| ≤
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
.
Therefore, ∀x,
∣∣Pr{Xn(n−2) ≤ x}− Φ(x)∣∣ ≤ C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
,
⇒
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr


∑
i,j(aij − µij)√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
≤ x

− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
⇒ Pr


∑
i,j
aij ≤
∑
i,j
µij + x ·
√∑
i,j
σ2ij


≤
∫ x
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt+
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
. (5)
Let x = −√2 lnn. Obviously, −x→ +∞ when n approaches infinity. Following (5), we obtain that
Pr


∑
i,j
aij ≤
∑
i,j
µij −
√
2 lnn ·
√∑
i,j
σ2ij


≤
∫ −√2 lnn
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
t2
2 dt+
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
≤ 1√
2pi
√
2 ln n
e− lnn +
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
≤ 1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
. (6)
Combining (4) and (6), we complete the proof.
Finally, we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4. The average-case approximation ratio of Random Priority, when agents’ preferences
are independent but not necessarily identically distributed random variables, is upper bounded by a
constant.
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Proof. We partition the value space of the ratio into two cases according to the threshold parameter
λ. In each case, we multiply the ratio by the probability that the case occurs. That is,
raverage(RP) = E
aij∼Dij
[
SWOPT(A)
SWRP(A)
]
≤ Pr{SWRP (A) > λ} · n
λ
+ Pr{SWRP (A) ≤ λ} · c1
√
n
We assemble the above building blocks and get that
raverage(RP) ≤ 1 · n
1 +
∑
i,j µij
n −
√
2 lnn
n ·
√∑
i,j σ
2
ij
+

 1
2n
√
pi lnn
+
C ′√∑
i,j σ
2
ij

 · c1√n
≤ n
2∑
µi,j


1
1−
(
√
2 lnn ·
√∑
σ2ij∑
µij
− n∑µij
)

+
c1
2
√
pin lnn
+
C ′ · c1
√
n√∑
σ2ij
According to the first condition, there ∃µ, ∃N0, such that ∀n > N0, n2∑µij ≤
1
µ . Note that
0 < aij < 1 and 0 < µij < 1, so
∑
µij < n
2, hence 1µ > 1. We also know that
∑
σ2ij < n
2. Together
with the first condition, we have that
√
2 lnn ·
√∑
σ2ij∑
µij
→ 0 and n∑µij → 0, when n→∞. Therefore,
there ∃N1, such that when n > N1,
∣∣∣∣∣
√
2 lnn
√∑
σ2ij∑
µij
− n∑µij
∣∣∣∣∣ < 12 . Hence, when n > max{N0, N1},
we have that
raverage(RP) ≤ 1
µ

1 + 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
2 ln n
√∑
σ2ij∑
µij
− n∑
µij
∣∣∣∣∣∣

+ c1
2
√
pin lnn
+
C ′ · c1
√
n√∑
σ2ij
=
1
µ
+
2
µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
√
2 lnn
√∑
σ2ij∑
µij
− n∑
µij
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
c1
2
√
pin lnn
+
C ′ · c1
√
n√∑
σ2ij
Because of condition (ii), we know that
√
n√∑
σ2ij
→ 0. In conclusion,
raverage(RP)→ 1
µ
+ 0 =
1
µ
.
5 Conclusion
This paper extended the average-case analysis in [16] from a uniform distribution to any independent
distribution and showed a constant upper bound of the approximation ratio. The average-case
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analysis complements classical worst-case analysis when the worst-case performance is insufficient
to characterize the performance of a mechanism. Our results further justify the wide-applicability
of the Random Priority mechanism.
There are a few technical points we would like to highlight here. Firstly, the techniques presented
in this paper are probably applicable to analyzing other mechanisms and other domains. Secondly,
there are various generalizations of the Berry-Esseen Theorem, and each of them may be cast
to prove similar results in Section 4. In an earlier version of the present paper, we had also
independently proved a version of the convergence rate. The difference in utilizing different versions
of these theorems is that they each require a set of conditions to make the rest of the proof work,
and the interpretations of those conditions could be different.
There are a number of problems remain open as well. For example, one may be interested
in investigating the average-case ratio of Random Priority in correlated domains. Also, it would
be interesting to proving tighter bounds by making more use of the structure of the assignment
problem domain.
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